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Deforestation and the Real Exchange Rate
Abstract
Deforestation is a phenomenon that has largely been concentrated in the developing world. We
construct a theoretical model of deforestation that focuses on the factors a¤ecting the incen-
tives to transform forested land into agricultural land. We show that: (i) lower discount rates
and stronger institutions decrease deforestation; (ii) depreciations in the real exchange rate in-
crease deforestation in developing countries whereas the opposite obtains in developed countries;
(iii) paradoxically, better institutions may exacerbate the deleterious impact of depreciations in
developing countries. These hypotheses are tested on an annual sample of 101 countries over
the 1961-1988 period, and are not rejected by the data. Our results suggest that short-term
macroeconomic policy, institutional factors, and the interaction between the two, are potentially
important determinants of environmental outcomes.
Keywords: deforestation, real e¤ective exchange rate, institutions.
JEL: O13, Q23, F31, F41
La forêt ici manque et là sest agrandie, Victor Hugo, Les Rayons et les
Ombres
Fear not till Birnam wood do come to Dunsinane,William Shakespeare,
Macbeth
1 Introduction
In recent years, deforestation, particularly in developing countries, has been of increasing
concern, mainly because of widespread fears of global warming and declining biodiversity.
The 2003World Development Report states that one-fth of all tropical forests have been
cleared since 1960. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), deforestation has been concentrated in the developing world. At the same
time, forest cover in industrial countries is stable or even increasing slightly.1 2
The aim of this paper is to understand why forest cover is decreasing in developing
countries while it is increasing in developed areas.3 Our line of reasoning is based on a
simple theoretical model which revolves around the choice facing an individual endowed
with a unit of forested land, and who has to decide whether to keep it as forest or clear
it and turn it into agricultural land. We then test the hypotheses that ow from our
theoretical model using aggregate country-level data.
Since land has several alternative uses, economic analysis can contribute to our un-
derstanding of the process of deforestation. On the one hand, forests allow for wood
production for domestic and export markets: wood may be used domestically for indus-
trial and rewood purposes, and timber products may be exported. On the other, forest
land is subject to encroachment by agricultural activities and grazing. The choice between
forest and agriculture use of the land depends, ceteris paribus, on the time preference of
1 We are particularly grateful to Henning Bohn and Robert T. Deacon for providing us with their
data on institutions. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 World Development Report 2003, p. 3.
3 In the data used in this paper, the annual rate of deforestation in the poorest quartile of observations
is equal to 0:1 percent, whereas the corresponding gure for the richest quartile of observations is equal
to  0:2 percent.
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individuals since wood production implies a long term investment in the forest. Since it
is often believed that discount rates are higher in poor countries than in rich countries, a
bias in favor of deforestation may exist in the former. Moreover, important institutional
issues arise because of the common property resource aspect of forests, as well as because
of poorly dened property rights. These forms of market failure are usually held to be
more likely in developing countries. To whit, forest resources are often over-utilized in de-
veloping countries because individual property rights are neither established nor enforced.
The example of collective land resulting from forest clearing, and used for grazing, is a
case in point.
The alternative uses of forest land also lie behind the importance accorded to popula-
tion growth and agricultural development in the analysis of deforestation. These factors
have been the subject of a good deal of empirical microeconomic analysis (for a survey
see Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999). However, simple economic models, such as the three
good, two factor general equilibrium model sketched by Foster and Rosenzweig (2003),
suggest that the impact of economic development on forest cover will depend upon the
relative rates of return to the forest and to alternative uses of the land in question. The
normal focus on factors which are associated with readily available data and amenable to
direct quantitative treatment explains why there has been relatively little work dealing ex-
plicitly with the impact of relative prices on forestation. In most microeconomic datasets,
there is little, if any, variation across households in the price of wood or in the price of
factor inputs, especially at the local level.4 Even if data on several regions dispersed geo-
graphically do allow one to address the lack of variation in prices using microeconometric
analysis, such data are rare.5 Even in this case, however, though the prices of factor
inputs (notably wages) are likely to vary, the price of wood is likely to be determined
internationally, and is therefore unlikely to display much variability on a regional basis.
The forest, though immobile (Macbeth and Birnam wood notwithstanding...), is in fact
an internationally tradable good whose price is determined largely on international mar-
4 Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999), p. 78.
5 See, e.g., ?.
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kets. This is obvious for exported timber, but it is also true for timber consumed by local
industry producing internationally traded goods such as paper or furniture, as it is for
rewood, which has ready substitutes in the form of imported petroleum products.
It is therefore clear that there is room for useful macroeconomic analyses of deforesta-
tion. Indeed, the numerous microeconomic studies of the factors that determine forest
area have dealt with a relatively limited number of countries and run the usual risks
inherent in using microeconomic studies to generalize concerning global processes. Most
importantly, a macroeconomic approach has less di¢ culty in accounting for the relative
return to the forest. This observation yields what we hold to be the most important
contribution of our paper: using macro panel data on deforestation allows us to take the
relative rate of return to the forest into account through macro-price indices such as the
relative price of wood to agricultural goods and the real exchange rate of each country.
Intuitively, it is clear that an increase in the relative price of wood should have a pos-
itive e¤ect on land under forest cover, though di¤erent responses are possible depending
on whether this change is perceived as being permanent or temporary. The consequence
of a change in the real exchange rate is less obvious. The real exchange rate represents
the price of tradables relative to non-tradables and is a proxy for the price of wood (an
internationally tradable good) relative to the price of labor (wages), which is domestically
determined. But it is also a proxy for the price of agricultural goods relative to wages,
provided that the agricultural sector is not overly protected vis-à-vis the outside world.
It is striking how sharp currency devaluations in developing countries, leading to real
exchange rate depreciation, have resulted in deforestation. For instance, following the 50
percent devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994, heavy timber tra¢ c on roads in Gabon
increased, domestic furniture production boomed in Abidjan and Dakar, carts carrying
rewood proliferated in rural Burkina Faso, and clearing obtained almost everywhere in
the CFA franc area. Similarly, after the collapse of the Indonesian rupiah in 1997, timber
exports increased and wood was substituted for petroleum products for domestic use.
One manifest inconvenience of the macroeconomic approach to deforestation is that
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the FAO forest data, which are unique in being internationally comparable, have been
the subject of a good deal of criticism, which is clearly justied in many cases (Rudel
and Roper (1997)). In particular, the FAO uses extrapolations based on a hypothesized
relationship between forest cover and population to ll inmissing observations. On the
other hand, to the extent that such measurement error is country-specic and relatively
persistent over time, the use of appropriate econometric technique, such as country-specic
xed e¤ects, should allow one to temper the initial pessimism concerning the possibility
of obtaining valid results using these data.6
Higher discount rates and less developed institutions provide a simple explanation for
why more individuals in developing countries are induced to deforest their land than is
the case in developed countries. Moreover we show, under plausible assumptions, that
a depreciation of the real exchange rate increases deforestation in developing countries
and reduces deforestation in developed ones. Since the real exchange rate has been ap-
preciating in developed countries and depreciating in the developing world, it may have
contributed signicantly to deforestation at the global level. Our model also allows us to
simultaneously address the role of more traditional factors that should a¤ect deforestation,
such as population density or its growth rate.
Several authors have considered an environmental Kuznets curve for forest cover
(Panayotou (1993), Cropper and Gri¢ ths (1994), Rock (1996), Bhattarai and Hammig
(2001)). According to this hypothesis, the marginal impact of GDP per capita on defor-
estation is positive for low levels of income, and becomes negative once a certain threshold
level of income has been reached. One of the most commonly-held justications for its
existence is that: logging and fuelwood uses of the forest are likely at rst to increase
with income. Agricultural and fuelwood motives for deforestation, however, are eventually
likely to decline with per capita GDP.7 Another explanation is based on a threshold level
of income per capita above which the psychological value ascribed to pristine forests
becomes su¢ ciently high for it to be in the interests of the population to reduce deforesta-
6 Moreover, their credibility is clearly high enough for the World Bank to use these data as part of its
overall assessment of sustainable development (World Development Indicators, 2002).
7 Cropper and Gri¢ ths (1994), p. 252.
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tion.8 This last argument suggests that it is di¢ cult to envisage testing for the presence
of a deforestation Kuznets curve without controlling for the relative price of the forest: if
psychological relative values are important, monetary relative values should be so as well.
The inclusion of the real exchange rate in such a specication is therefore essential.
This paper is organized as follows. In part 2, we present our theoretical model and
derive a series of Propositions that describe the comparative statics of deforestation
with respect to a number of key variables of interest, including the rate of time preference,
institutional quality, relative prices, and income. In part 3, we set out the empirical coun-
terpart to our theoretical model, and highlight a series of easily testable (and refutable)
hypotheses. We then present our empirical results, based on estimation using an unbal-
anced panel of 101 countries over a maximum 28 year time span. These results, whether
they are based on the within estimator, GMM estimation, or a dynamic common factor
restriction of the dynamics of deforestation, largely corroborate the theoretical hypotheses
set out in part 2.
2 A theoretical model of deforestation
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a population of individuals each of whom is endowed with one unit of forested
land.9 Individuals are innitely lived and decide in the rst period of their lives what to
do with their endowment of land. All agents are blessed with perfect foresight, and take
prices as exogenously given. Two choices are possible.
First, they may keep the land as forest, which yields a per period prot at time t
of F (t) = pB(t)qF (lF (t))   w(t)lF (t)   F (t); where labor, denoted by l(t), is the sole
variable factor input, w(t) is the wage rate, qF (:) is the production technology that turns
labor (and other xed factors) into wood output, pB(t) is the price of wood and F (t) are
8 The expression pristine forestsis from Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999), p. 89.
9 Note that one could begin with the alternative hypothesis that each individual is endowed with one
unit of agricultural land. This would lead to a model of reforestation (rather than deforestation), where
most of the arguments that follow would be reversed.
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other xed costs incured in the production process. The latter are essentially associated
with the quality of institutions (denoted by I, where a higher value of I corresponds to
"better" institutions), where we expect @F (t)=@I = FI (t) < 0:
The second choice involves turning the endowment of forest land into agricultural
land and, in the process, selling the wood that is obtained through clearing. In what
follows, we assume that the process of deforestation is irreversible. The sale of the
wood from clearing yields a prot equal to C(t) = pB(t)qC(lC(t))   w(t)lC(t)   C(t);
where qC(:) represents the clearing technology, while agricultural use of the land yields
A(t) = pA(t)qA(lA(t))   w(t)lA(t)   A(t), where pA(t) is the price of the agricultural
product, and qA(:) is the agricultural production technology. In each of these activi-
ties, individuals are assumed to minimize costs and to maximize prots. Assuming that
each production technology is increasing and concave in l(t) yields conventional prot
functions F (pB(t); w(t)); C(pB(t); w(t)); A(pA(t); w(t)) as well as conventional costs
functions Ci(qi(t); w(t)); i = F;C;A that satisfy the usual properties, such as Shephards
or Hotellings Lemma. The theoretical model presented below will show that the choice of
whether to deforest or not will depend on (i) the rate of time preference, (ii) the quality
of institutions, (iii) relative prices, and (iv) other factors traditionally associated with
deforestation.
2.2 Choosing whether to deforest or not: the role of the rate of
time preference
From the outset, we pose the following hypotheses that will guarantee that the choice
between deforesting and keeping land under forest cover will not become degenerate.
Assumption 1: C(pB(t); w(t))  F (pB(t); w(t)) > 0:
Assumption 2: F (pB(t); w(t))  A(pA(t); w(t)) > 0:
Assumption 3: CF (qF (t); w(t)) = CC(qC(t); w(t)):
Assumption 1 states that the single period prot from clearing a plot of land is
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greater than the single period prot from a sustainableharvesting of forest resources.
Assumption 2, on the other hand, states that the single-period prot from sustainable
harvesting of forest resources is greater than the corresponding prot from switching the
land into agriculture. Assumption 2 is crucial in that, were it not to be satised, it
would be individually rational to deforest all land.10 Assumption 1 combined with
Assumption 2 implies that there is an interesting tradeo¤ involved in deforestation. On
the one hand, clearing yields a one-shot single period prot that is larger than what one
would obtain from sustainable harvesting of forest resources. On the other hand, this
short-term increase in prots is tempered by the fact that one then loses the di¤erence
between F and A (which is positive by Assumption 2) for all successive periods.
The tradeo¤ between short-term gains to clearing and long-term losses to having cleared
constitutes the crux of our model, and invariably leads to a key role for an individuals
discount rate.
Assumption 3 is not crucial (and can be weakened somewhat), but simply translates
the intuitively appealing notion that Assumption 1 stems not from di¤erences in costs
of clearing versus costs of sustainably harvesting the forest, but rather from the greater
revenue one obtains by clearing all trees o¤ the land (and thus rendering it amenable to
agricultural activity) versus harvesting forest resources sustainably.
The present-discounted value (PDV) of keeping the land as forest is given by:
W F =
t=+1X
t=0
F (pB(t); w(t))
(1 + r(t))t
:
If one assumes that the prot from sustainable forest use is the same in each period and
that the interest rate is constant, one obtains:
W F = F (pB; w)
t=+1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
= F (pB; w)
1 + r
r
:
10 Apart from the preceding theoretical argument, Perz (2004), in a study of small holders in the Brazil-
ian Amazon, notes that "farms with greater agricultural diversity have signicantly higher agricultural
incomes but not signicantly less primary forest cover." (p. 971) For this example, at least, the income
drawn from sustainable harvesting of the forest must therefore still be greater than the income that could
be drawn from agricultural use, even after an increase in the latter.
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When the choice is to deforest, the PDV of the cleared land is given by:
WA = C(pB; w) + A(pA; w)
t=+1X
t=1

1
1 + r
t
;
where we assume that agricultural prot obtains only in the period following clearing (i.e.,
starting in period 1). This expression can be rewritten as:
WA = C(pB; w) + A(pA; w)
"
t=+1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
  1
#
= C(pB; w) + A(pA; w)
1
r
:
Individuals will then deforest when:
W F = F (pB; w)
1 + r
r
< C(pB; w) + A(pA; w)
1
r
= WA:
Assume that individuals di¤er according to their discount rate r. More formally, suppose
that the discount rate r is distributed in the population according to the probability
density function f(r) over the interval [0; r], where we assume that:
F (pB; w)  A(pA; w) < r  C(pB; w)  F (pB; w) :
This assumption states that the gain to clearing (with respect to sustainable harvesting
of the forest) must be su¢ ciently large relative to the loss in prots stemming from
conversion to agriculture. Essentially, this is a technical condition which, as will be
shown below, ensures that some individuals do in fact choose to deforest their land. Let
r be the limitdiscount rate such that an individual is just indi¤erent between leaving
his land as forest or clearing it. This value of the discount rate is dened implicitly by:
F (pB; w)
1 + r
r
  C(pB; w)  A(pA; w) 1
r
= 0;
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which implies that
r =
F (pB; w)  A(pA; w)
C(pB; w)  F (pB; w) : (1)
The denition of r given in equation 1 constitutes the basis of all of the theoretical
results that follow. Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that r > 0, since both the denominator
and the numerator of this expression will then be positive, while the assumption made
above guarantees that r < r . It follows that r 2 [0; r] and that some portion of the
population will choose to deforest their land, while the remainder will chose to keep their
land under forest cover. Assumption 2, on the other hand, implies thatW = W F WA
is decreasing in r. To see why, consider the derivative of W , with respect to r: This
yields:
dW
dr
=
A(pA; w)  F (pB; w)
r2
< 0
where the sign follows directly from Assumption 2. Consider now the limits of W as
r ! 0 and as r ! r: We obtain:
lim
r!0
W = lim
r!0
1
r
0B@ F (pB; w)  A(pA; w)
 r  C(pB; w)  F (pB; w)
1CA = +1;
and
lim
r!r
W =
1
r
 
C(pB; w)  F (pB; w) (r   r) < 0:
The relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.
Intuitively, individuals such that r 2 [0; r] choose to keep their land under forest cover
since their discount rate is low: they therefore put more weight on the loss in prots
stemming from conversion to agricultural activity than on the short-term gains to clearing.
Individuals with r 2 [r; r] choose to clear: they put relatively more weight on the short-
term gains to clearing than on the intertemporal losses stemming from conversion to
agricultural activities. The preceding results immediately yield the following important
Proposition:11
11 All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Individuals to the left of r keep their land under forest cover, individuals to
the right of r deforest.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, deforestation is an increasing function of
the average discount rate of the population:
Proposition 1 implies that if the average discount rate in the population decreases
as per capita income increases, deforestation should decrease. Conversely, the poorer a
country, and thus the greater the average discount rate of the population, the greater
should be deforestation. An illustration of the link between income and the discount
rate is provided by Contreras-Hermosilla (2000), who notes that: "the hypothesis that
the poor have a higher discount rate and are more inclined to deforest is conrmed by
various studies and by the commonly observed fact that they are willing to borrow in
informal markets characterized by very high interest rates." (p. 9)
In the following sections, we consider the comparative statics of deforestation with
respect to ve di¤erent changes in the underlying environment. Formally, all proofs are
based on the comparative statics of r. We begin with the impact of institutions, followed
by the main topic of this paper, relative prices, with a focus on the e¤ect on deforestation
of depreciations of the real exchange rate and increases in the relative price of timber. We
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also show that, under reasonable assumptions, the impact of depreciations will be di¤erent
in developing and developed countries. We then consider the impact on deforestation of
demographic factors, and conclude the subsection with a discussion of the environmental
Kuznets curve.
2.3 The quality of institutions
Among the determinants of deforestation, institutions are often held to play a leading
role. The enforcement of property rights obviously constitutes the most important di-
mension of institutions that will a¤ect deforestation. But the existence of institutions
that a¤ect the ability of agents to market forestry or agricultural products, and the fact
that agricultural products are potentially more prone to self-consumption than forestry
products, will also a¤ect choices. In what follows, we show how institutional concerns
can easily be incorporated into the basic model. We then derive the comparative statics
of deforestation with respect to institutions.
While it is clear that institutions a¤ect the prots associated with all three forms
of activity (sustainable forest harvesting, clearing, and agricultural production), it is
probably not unreasonable to assume that it is sustainable harvesting of forest products
that is most sensitive to the existence of clear property rights and their enforcement. This
is because, as Bohn and Deacon (2000) note, the forest is equivalent to a stock of capital,
and
drawing it down for consumption is equivalent to disinvestment. Disin-
vestment is likely when property rights are insecure because the risk of losing
ownership causes the future return frommaintaining the stock to be discounted
heavily....When ownership is insecure, we expect trees to be cut at an earlier
age and the acreage replanted following harvest to be reduced. In other words,
low forest stocks and weak property rights should accompany one another. (p.
527)
Conversely, by its very nature, agricultural production entails living on the land,
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while clearing is often associated with hit and run operations, and may indeed be a
means of establishing squattersrights to agricultural land. As such, our basic working
hypothesis shall be that A(pA; w) and C(pB; w) are una¤ected by institutional concerns,
whereas F = F (pB; w; I) is, with @
F
@I
> 0: Strictly-speaking, it is of course not true that
A(pA; w) is una¤ected by institutions: for example, decisions surrounding the mainte-
nance of land quality and investment are intimately related to institutional arrangements.
On the other hand, our assumption is not meant to translate strict independence, only
that F is more sensitive to institutions than are A and C . The comparative stat-
ics in this case are particularly easy to establish, and immediately yield the following
Proposition:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an improvement in institutions reduces
deforestation.
In terms of the graphical illustration given by Figure 1, an improvement in institutions
shifts r towards the right (dr

dI
> 0), thereby reducing the proportion of the population
that wishes to clear its endowment of forest land. If institutional underdevelopment is a
characteristic of developing countries, as is a high rate of time preference, then our model
clearly predicts greater rates of deforestation in developing countries than in developed
countries.
2.4 Changes in relative prices
Dene the relative price of timber as pR = p
B
pA
and the real exchange rate as e = p
T
pNT
,
where pT is the price of tradables and pNT the price of non-tradables. Given the simple
structure of our model, pT = (pB)1 (pA), where  is the share of agricultural production
in the total output of tradables, and pNT is entirely determined by the domestic wage,
which we chose as the numeraire: pNT = w = 1:12 Simple algebra then implies that one
12 The price index for tradables takes a "geometric" form for two reasons. First, because it is more
convenient algebraically than an arithmetic average. Second, it corresponds to the assumption that
consumer preferences take a Cobb-Douglas form and hence that the cost of living is Cobb-Douglas in
prices.
12
can write:
pA = e
 
pR
 1
; pB = e
 
pR

This implies that we can rewrite r as:
r =
F
 
e
 
pR

; w
  A e  pR 1 ; w
C (e (pR) ; w)  F (e (pR) ; w) (2)
2.4.1 The real exchange rate
A key aspect of our model is that it focuses on the impact of changes in the real exchange
rate on the incentives to engage in deforestation. Recall that a depreciation in the real
exchange rate (an increase in the price of tradables versus non-tradables) may a¤ect the
real price of timber and of agricultural goods (with respect to the numeraire).13 First,
a depreciation increases the relative price of exported timber. Second, a depreciation
increases the return to timber-consuming activities that produce internationally traded
goods (such as paper or furniture). This is true whether the goods in question are destined
for the export market or compete with imports. Third, a depreciation increases the
relative price of energy (oil, gas and electricity) and thus the price of wood for heating and
cooking. Finally, a depreciation increases the return to agricultural activities, irrespective
of whether these are constituted by export or food crops (some of which may compete
with imported products).
Our basic result is that real depreciations result in an increase in deforestation in
developing countries, whereas the opposite obtains in developed countries. Three dif-
ferent hypotheses can generate this result. The rst approach contrasts developing and
developed countries in terms of the relative costs of sustainable forest harvesting versus
agricultural production, and focuses on changes in the real exchange rate that are seen
as being permanent. The second explanation is based on the assumption that, in gen-
13 Edwards (1988) notes that "according to an early denition, the real exchange rate is equal to the
nominal exchange rate (E) corrected (that is, multiplied) by the ratio of the foreign price level (P*) to the
domestic price level (P).... More recently, however, most authors have dened the real exchange rate in
the context of models of dependent economies, as the relative price of tradable to nontradable goods...."
(p. 47)
13
eral, variations in the real exchange rate are perceived as being temporary phenomena
in developing countries: we show that, when a depreciation is seen as being temporary,
it will always increase deforestation. Finally, when protectionism results in agricultural
goods becoming non-tradables (as is arguably the case for the agricultural sectors of most
developed countries), a depreciation always results in a decrease in deforestation.
We begin with the comparative statics of a permanent increase in the real exchange
rate. The crucial hypotheses that we need are summarized in the followingAssumptions.
Assumption 4: For developing countries, CF (qF (t); w(t)) < CA(qA(t); w(t)):
Assumption 5: For developed countries, CF (qF (t); w(t)) > CA(qA(t); w(t)):
Assumptions 4 and 5 can be justied by assuming that agriculture is extremely labor-
intensive in developing countries. Since labor costs will constitute the most important
element of CA in developing countries, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that
CF < CA.14 In developed countries, on the other hand, agriculture is much less labor-
intensive, whereas forest-harvesting technologies are not always of an industrial nature:
assuming that CF > CA therefore would appear to be reasonable for developed countries.
With these Assumptions in hand, we then have the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3:
(i) when Assumption 4 holds (i.e., for less developed countries) a depreciation of the
real exchange rate increases deforestation;
(ii) when Assumption 5 holds (i.e., for developed countries), a depreciation of the
real exchange rate reduces deforestation.
Proposition 3(i) is based on the fact that, for less developed countries, dr

de
< 0: In
Figure 1, this means that a depreciation shifts r to the left. It follows that a depreciation
14 Moreover, Bhattarai and Hammig (2004) argue that "timber harvesting and large-scale logging by
large companies" (p. 379) constitute one of the key determinants of deforestation in several developing
countries: such technologies are therefore, by their very nature, not labor-intensive, thereby reinforcing
our assumption that CF < CA for developing countries.
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(an increase in e) will increase deforestation in developing countries, whereas (by Propo-
sition 3(ii)) the opposite (dr

de
> 0) will occur in developed countries. Proposition 3 is
readily amenable to empirical testing, as we shall show below.
We now consider our second explanation for the deleterious impact on deforestation, in
developing countries, of depreciations in the real exchange rate. Why would depreciations
be more likely to be considered temporary in developing countries than in developed
countries? Casual empiricism suggests that, since the oating of exchange rates at the
begining of the 1970s, all countries have su¤ered from a great deal of volatility in their
real exchange rates, with that a¤ecting developing countries being signicantly greater.
Most producers in these countries have therefore grown used to wide uctuations in the
real exchange rate. It follows that there is a widespread belief in these countries that
most variations in the real exchange rate are transitory.15
Consider then a temporary increase in the real exchange rate, which lasts one period
(more precisely, it last only for the rst period). This is equivalent to an initial value of
e(0) = e, followed thereafter by a real exchange rate e(t) = e; t > 0; with e < e: In this
case, one can write
W F = F
 
e
 
pR

; w

+ F
 
e
 
pR

; w
 t=+1X
t=1

1
1 + r
t
= F
 
e
 
pR

; w

+ F
 
e
 
pR

; w
 1
r
whereas WA is now given by
WA = C
 
e
 
pR

; w

+ A

e
 
pR
 1
; w
 1
r
15 This intuition is conrmed in our data. In the poorest quartile of the sample used in the estimations
presented in the rst three columns of Table 2, the standard deviation of the real e¤ective exchange rate
is equal to 52:2, whereas in the richest quartile, the corresponding gure is 30:8.
This observation is in conformity with the conclusions of Sauer and Bohara (2001), who have calculated
three di¤erent measures of real exchange rate volatility for 22 industrialized and 69 developing countries,
over the 1973-93 period. They note that, for each measure, the developing countries exhibit much higher
real exchange rate volatility than do the industrialized countries.
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Individuals will then deforest when:
W F = F
 
e
 
pR

; w

+ F
  
pR

; w
 1
r
< C
 
e
 
pR

; w

+ A
 
pR
 1
; w
 1
r
= WA
This expression denes a di¤erent limitvalue of r; denoted by er; given by
er = F  e  pR ; w  A

e
 
pR
 1
; w

C (e (pR) ; w)  F (e (pR) ; w) (3)
It is then easy to establish the following result:
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1 and 3 a temporary depreciation increases defor-
estation.
In terms of Figure 1, a temporary increase in the real exchange rate results in a leftward
shift in the limit value er (der
de
< 0), and thus yields an increase in deforestation, contrary
to the impact of a permanent increase in the same variable.
Note that a third explanation for the di¤erence in the impact of a depreciation of
the real exchange rate between developing and developed countries can be furnished by
assuming that, because of protectionist agricultural policies in developed countries, agri-
cultural goods should not be considered as tradables. This implies that a permanent
depreciation is equivalent to a permanent increase in the relative price of timber. We
summarize this idea in the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 Suppose that agricultural output is non-tradable; then a permanent de-
preciation reduces deforestation.
To summarize, our main arguments concerning the impact of real depreciations on
deforestation are that in developing countries, an increase in e increases deforestation.
This e¤ect obtains either because (i) the depreciation is perceived as being permanent
concomitantly with Assumption 4 holding (Proposition 3(i)); or (ii) the increase in e
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is perceived as being temporary (Proposition 4). In contrast, in developed countries an
increase in e decreases deforestation, and this obtains either (i) because the increase in e
is permanent and Assumption 5 holds (Proposition 3(ii)); or (ii) agricultural output
is non-tradable because of protectionism (Propositions 5).
2.4.2 The relative price of timber
Consider a change in the relative price of timber. The following Proposition is then
immediate:
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3:
(i) a permanent increase in the relative price of timber reduces deforestation;
(ii) a temporary increase in the relative price of timber increases deforestation.
Proposition 6(i) stems from the limit value r being an increasing function of the
relative price of timber. Graphically, an increase in pR shifts r to the right in Figure 1
( dr

dpR
> 0). The converse is true for Proposition 6(ii).
2.4.3 The interaction of institutions and the real exchange rate
Of equal interest, given our focus on the impact of relative prices, is how institutions
a¤ect the marginal impact of the real exchange rate on deforestation. In this case, the
relevant derivative is given by
d2r
dIde
=
 
pR
 d
dI
h
1
pB
 
pBqF   pAqA  C   F    qC   qF   F   Ai
(C   F )2
We show in the Appendix (proof of Proposition 7) that this expression can be rewritten
as
d2r
dIde
=
 
pR
 CFI  qC   qF   qFI  CF   CA
(C   F )2 + 2

FI
C   F

dr
de
: (4)
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Proposition 1 a higher discount rate increases deforestation
Proposition 2 better institutions reduce deforestation
Propositions 3 a depreciation in the real exchange rate increases deforestation in
4 and 5 developing countries and reduces deforestation in developed countries
Proposition 6 a permanent rise in the price of timber reduces deforestation, while
a temporary rise increases deforestation
Proposition 7 the impact of better institutions on the marginal impact of
the real exchange rate is ambiguous
Table 1: Theoretical predictions
This expression implies that the impact of institutions on the marginal e¤ect of the real
exchange rate is ambiguous:16
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 the impact of an improvement in in-
stitutions on the marginal e¤ect of the exchange rate on deforestation is ambiguous:
Table 1 summarizes the main predictions of our theoretical model.
2.5 Traditional factors a¤ecting deforestation
2.5.1 Demographic factors
There exists a vast literature that considers the impact of demographic factors on de-
forestation. The ndings of this literature are ambiguous and sometimes contradictory.
Population growth or increases in population density are often held to increase defor-
estation, although it is sometimes posited that, beyond a certain threshold, they induce
technological change in agriculture that slows the process (Boserup (1965); see Angelsen
and Kaimowitz (1999), for a survey of this literature). It is worth emphasizing, however,
16 If one wishes to determine the sign of equation 4, some additional structure would be needed in
terms of how exactly institutions a¤ect prots stemming from sustainable harvesting. Recall from our
preliminaries that we see weak institutions as imposing a xed cost on sustainable harvesting: F =
pBqF (lF )   wlF   FI (I); where FI (I) < 0: This specication implies that FI =  FI (I) > 0; CFI =
FI (I) < 0 and q
F
I = 0. This implies that when Assumption 4 holds (i.e., for developing countries), an
improvement in institutions exacerbates the marginal impact of a depreciation on deforestation. This
would imply an additional three-part interaction term (I  e y) in the econometrics that follow.
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that most work on this topic bases its analysis of the impact of population factors on
deforestation on the e¤ect of the former on relative prices (for example, through changes
in the wage rate or in food prices). As such, the price variables considered above should
already be accounting for many of the e¤ects of population pressures. For example, if
population growth leads to lower wages, this would be translated in our model by a de-
preciation of the real exchange rate. The results presented in Propositions 3, 4 and 5
therefore apply. In particular, our results imply that population pressures should, through
their impact on relative prices, increase deforestation in developing countries.
2.5.2 The Kuznets curve
Several authors have considered that the marginal impact of GDP per capita may be
positive for low levels of income and negative for high levels. As we recalled in the intro-
duction, the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis, applied to the forest, is based on
various arguments. The rst explanation assumes that during the early stages of devel-
opment, logging or re wood demand are on the rise while forest clearing for agricultural
activities or grazing also increase. After a threshold level of development is reached, these
factors are dampened by the diversication of activities into the industrial and service
sectors, as well as by urbanisation. As in the case of population pressures, the impact
of these factors on deforestation operates through changes in relative prices, which are
already accounted for in our model. An alternative explanation of a potential Kuznets
curve for deforestation is based on the psychological value ascribed to pristine forests,
which is assumed to be decreasing during the early phases of development and increasing
thereafter. In the framework of our model, this hypothesis corresponds to a very particular
relationship between the average rate of time preference of the population and GDP per
capita. Instead of being a monotonically decreasing function, the average discount rate
of the population may at rst be an increasing function of GDP per capita (because of a
highly pressing need to improve living standards) and, after a threshold level of income is
reached, this relationship may turn negative. To test for the presence of an environmental
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Kuznets curve, we shall introduce GDP per capita, as well as GDP per capita squared,
into the specication.17
3 Econometric specication and results
3.1 The basic estimating equation
Our basic econometric specication is given by an equation in which the dependent vari-
able is the rate of deforestation, and where the explanatory variables are those suggested
by our theoretical model. Formally-speaking, assume that there exists a steady-state level
of the logarithm of forest cover in country i at time t, lnT Fi;t , as determined by our theo-
retical model, and that the dynamics of forest cover can be described by a linear rst-order
di¤erence equation that is given by lnT Fi;t =  lnT
F
i;t 1 + 0, where 0 is a constant. By a
rst-order Taylor approximation around the steady-state, one obtains:
lnT Fi;t = lnT
F +
 
lnT Fi;t 1   lnT Fi;t

:
Subtracting lnT Fi;t 1 from both sides and rearranging yields
   lnT Fi;t   lnT Fi;t 1 = (1  ) lnT Fi;t 1 + (   1) lnT Fi;t :
The basic econometric specication then follows by posing (   1) lnT Fi;t = Xit; which
yields
   lnT Fi;t   lnT Fi;t 1 = (1  ) lnT Fi;t 1 +Xit + it
17 The Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect states that the equilibrium real exchange rate appreciates as GDP per
capita increases. Assume for arguments sake that this relationship is linear. If, as we have shown, the
marginal e¤ect of the real exchange rate on deforestation is a function of the level of GDP per capita
(Propositions 3, 4 and 5) and takes a multiplicative form then, by substitution of the Balassa-Samuelson
e¤ect, one obtains by construction, an inverse environmental Kuznets curve, in which deforestation will
be rst decreasing and then increasing in GDP per capita. It follows that if, aside from exchange rate
e¤ects, there are reasons to expect an environmental Kuznets curve, it may be obscured by the inverted
Kuznets curve generated by the real exchange rate, if the real exchange rate is not explicitly included as
an explanatory variable in the empirical specication.
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where Xit is a matrix of explanatory variables corresponding to those determinants of the
steady-state level of forest cover identied in our theoretical work, and it is a disturbance
term. More explicitly,
Xit =

yit; y
2
it; Iit; p
R
it ; eit; Iiteit; yiteit; Dit

;
where Dit represents demographic variables. This yields the following empirical specica-
tion:18
zit = (1  ) lnT Fi;t 1 + yit1 + y2it2 + Iit3 + pRit4 (5)
+eit5 + yiteit6 + Iiteit7 +Dit8 + it;
where zit   
 
lnT Fi;t   lnT Fi;t 1

denotes the rate of deforestation.
3.2 Assumptions on the error term
Assume that the error term in equation (5) can be decomposed as:
it = t + i + "it; (6)
where t is a time-specic e¤ect, i is a country-specic e¤ect, and "it is the disturbance
term. Then the orthogonality conditions that one is willing to assume determine the
appropriate method of estimation. If the country-specic e¤ects i are correlated with
the explanatory variables, with the latter, in turn, being orthogonal to "it, the within
estimator is appropriate. On the other hand if one suspects, in addition to correlated
country-specic e¤ects, that the explanatory variables are correlated with "it, some form
of instrumental variables (IV) estimation is called for. In what follows we shall there-
18 The reader familiar with the existing econometric literature on the determinants of deforestation
will have noted that we explicitly consider the dynamics of deforestation, which we model as a rst-
order di¤erence equation. Just as it is appropriate to write a conventional growth of GDP per capita
equation while allowing for convergence e¤ects through the inclusion of the initial level of GDP per capita,
one should include the initial level of forest cover as an explanatory variable. Most existing empirical
treatments of the question have not taken this key fact into account.
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fore consider both the within estimator and three versions of the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimation methodology.
3.2.1 Within estimation
The number of countries in our unbalanced panel data being equal to N = 101, and the
number of time periods per country ranging from 1 to 28 suggests that our econometric
work should be best carried out under the assumption of xed T and large N . This
assumption is important in that it conditions all of the statistical inference that follows.19
Assuming xed T implies that the within estimator is inconsistent even in the absence
of correlation between the explanatory variables and "it, since a non-negligible negative
correlation is induced between the transformed level of initial forest cover and the trans-
formed error term which does not vanish as N gets large (for the standard treatment, see
Nickell (1981)).
3.2.2 The common factor representation and GMM estimation
While the "within" transformation (i.e. country-specic xed e¤ects) allows us to control
for bias stemming from time-invariant unobservable country-specic heterogeneity (i),
there remains the potential correlation between "it and our explanatory variables. More-
over, due to the likely autoregressive structure of the disturbance term "it, which we write
as
"it = "it 1 + it;with jj < 1; (7)
one cannot simply use lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels as instruments
in an equation expressed in rst-di¤erences, as is commonly done (i.e. di¤erence-GMM),
or lagged rst-di¤erences of the explanatory variables as instruments for an equation in
levels, or a combination of both (system-GMM).20 Indeed, if we assume that the explana-
19 Using the opposite asymptotics (i.e., assuming that N is xed and T is large) would imply that
the within estimator would provide consistent estimates of the parameters, in the absence of correlation
between our explanatory variables and "it.
20 The basics are well spelled out in the standard textbooks by Wooldridge (2002), or Arellano (2003).
The key references on rst-di¤erenced GMM estimation are Arellano and Bond (1991a) and Arellano and
Bond (1991b), while Arellano and Bover (1995) is the standard reference on system-GMM estimation.
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tory variables are correlated with the country-specic e¤ects i and with the stochastic
disturbance term "it, and that the latter is autocorrelated, there are no orthogonality
conditions, in the absence of external instrumental variables, that would allow one to
consistently estimate the coe¢ cients of interest in equation (5).
However, as noted by Blundell and Bond (2000), this type of model has a dynamic
common factor representation which involves  di¤erencing the model so as to obtain:
zit = (1  ) lnT Fi;t 1    (1  ) lnT Fi;t 2 +Xit  Xit 1
+zit 1 + (t   t 1)| {z }
t
+ (1  )i| {z }
i
+ "it   "it 1| {z }
it
;
which can be rewritten as:
zit = 1 lnT
F
i;t 1 + 2 lnT
F
i;t 2 +Xit3 +Xit 14 + zit 1+ 

t + 

i + it; (8)
and where the common factor restrictions are given by
2 =  1 and 4 =  3: (9)
In the absence of measurement error, the error term in (8), i.e., it, is serially uncorre-
lated, which allows one to use traditional GMM techniques to consistently estimate the
parameters of interest.21
In what follows, we will augment standard GMM estimation techniques which use
lagged values of the explanatory variables themselves as instruments, by adding a num-
ber of external instruments that are suggested by theoretical considerations. Though
we do not possess a su¢ cient number of excluded instruments for it to be possible to
apply standard IV techniques, the addition of these external instruments should go some
way towards vitiating the potential "weak instruments" problem that often arises in the
context of traditional GMM estimation.
21 In the presence of serially uncorrelated measurement error, it will follow an MA(1) process.
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3.3 The data
We consider an unbalanced panel of 101 countries with the maximum time span being
1961-1988: the reason for the 1988 cuto¤date is that our key institutional variable is only
available up to that period (more on this below). Even when using other institutional
variables, annual data on deforestation is only available up until 1994. Our dependent
variable is the annual rate of deforestation (minus the di¤erence in logarithms of forest
area, expressed in thousands of hectares), when forest area is strictly positive (source:
FAO, The State of the Worlds Forests, various years). GDP per capita and demographic
variables are from the World Banks World Tables.
Note that, according to our theoretical model, the average rate of time preference of
the population is a key determinant of deforestation. It would have been appropriate to
proxy this variable by the long-term interest rate. Unfortunately, such an interest rate is
unavailable for most developing countries, and the corresponding short-term rates, that
are available, are subject to so much short-run variation that it is di¢ cult to see them
proxying for the rate of time preference (the short term rates might also proxy for the risk
premium, which should already be accounted for by our institutional variable). Since the
average discount rate of the population is likely to be a decreasing function of GDP per
capita, the latter will constitute our proxy for r, although it is di¢ cult to identify the time
preference e¤ect alone with this variable. GDP per capita will also pick up other e¤ects
such as those associated with the business cycle. As such, we shall avoid establishing
a strict correspondence between the theoretical comparative statics of Proposition 1,
and our empirical results, in structural terms.
Note that we do not impose an arbitrary cuto¤ level of GDP per capita above which
a country will be deemed to be "developed": our operational denition of a developed
country will be determined by our econometric results, and will correspond to the level
of GDP per capita above which the marginal impact of real exchange rate depreciations
on deforestation become negative.
Our measure of institutions is given by the indicator developed by Bohn and Deacon
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(2000), who construct an index of ownership risk (given by the probability of expropriation
), by postulating that ownership risk is related to observable political attributes of
countries (political instability and types of government regimes).22 They use cross-country
data on the investment rate and political characteristics to estimate the form of the
relationship. They then construct an index of ownership security, a monotone decreasing
function of  ... by multiplying together the political variables and coe¢ cients (of the
previous regression) and summing.23
The real exchange rate of country i at time t is approximated by the real e¤ective
exchange rate computed as
eit =
j=10Y
j=1

enijt
pjt
pit
j
(10)
where enijt is the nominal exchange rate index of country i versus country j (expressed in
terms of the national currency), pit is the consumer price index in country i (and similarly
for j), j represents the share in country is imports furnished by country j, and where the
js are constituted by the ten most important (non-oil) trading partners of country i (these
shares are given by the average values for the period 1980-6; the source for all these data
is the IMF).24 Note that an increase in this index corresponds to a real depreciation.25
The relative price of timber pRit is approximated by the ratio of the price of hardwood
logs in Sarawak, Malaysia (in $US=m3, source: IMF, International Financial Statistics,
22 They use the indicators of political institutions developed by Banks (1990).
23 We are very grateful to Henning Bohn and Robert T. Deacon for providing us with their index. This
comprises 3146 observations and has been used with success by the authors in their explanations of oil
discovery and production, as well as deforestation. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, this index only
runs until 1988.
An alternative indicator of institutions that we considered using was that from the Freedom in the World
Survey. The Survey rates countries based on real world situations caused by state and nongovernmental
factors. It encompasses two general sets of characteristics grouped under political rights (index 1) and
civil liberties (index 2). Given that, in the context of deforestation, it is an indicator of institutions
associated with property rights that one needs, the Freedom House index is not an appropriate proxy.
Another measure of institutions that we considered was that constructed for the POLITY project. This
is a source of cross-national, longitudinal data on the degree of democracy and autocracy, available in
its most recent version from the Centre for International Development and Conict Management at the
University of Maryland. Moreover, as with the Freedom House index, the POLITY index is a measure of
political institutions, not institutions associated with property rights. Both indices yielded statistically
insignicant results when substituted for the Bohn and Deacon index in our empirical work.
24 Note that, when pit or pjt were missing, they were replaced by the domestic GDP deator.
25 The real e¤ective exchange rate will be a good proxy for the relative price of tradables to nontradables,
though it will underestimate it (see Edwards (1988), p. 48).
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various issues) to the country-specic unit export values of agricultural goods (source:
FAO).
Finally, as noted above, we augment standard GMM estimation with external in-
trumental variables whose purpose is to allow us to better identify the causal impact
of the real exchange rate on the rate of deforestation. The equilibrium real exchange
rate literature focuses on determinants of the long run real e¤ective exchange, such as
the productivity gap between a country and its foreign trading partners (through the
Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect), international capital net inows, terms of trade and public
consumption expenditure (Edwards (1989), Montiel (1999)). The two rst determinants
are potential instruments for the real exchange rate as they are available for most of the
observations in our sample. This is not the case of the last two. As such, we augment the
traditional GMM instrumental variables constituted by the lagged values of the explana-
tory variables themselves, by the average GDP per capita of the main foreign trading
partners, as the latter were dened for the calculation of the e¤ective exchange rate. We
also add the balance of exports and imports of goods and services, as a fraction of GDP,
and the average of the consumption price indices of foreign partners. A priori these three
instrumental variables should be orthogonal with respect to the disturbance term it, al-
though we will of course assess their validity using the usual test of the overidentifying
restrictions. Descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the econometric work
are presented in Table 2.
Note that an essential preliminary to the empirical methods that we wish to implement
is the examination of the time-series properties of the variables, as stressed by Bond (2002),
who points out many pitfalls often associated with GMM estimation with persistent series.
In particular, a near unit root in a given series renders the available instruments in
levels extremely weak since their rst di¤erence will possess very little variance. This is
obvious in the next-to-last column of Table 2 where it becomes apparent that the standard
deviations of at least three series in rst-di¤erenced form are at most one tenth of their
counterparts in levels: in descending order, they are rural population density, log GDP
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per capita, and log forest cover. More formally, in the last column of Table 2, we report
the results of simple AR(1) representations of our key variables, obtained using a system-
GMM estimator. The three aforementioned series all displays near unit root processes.
It will therefore be important, in our estimations, to assess the robustness of our ndings
using the system-GMM estimator and the common factor restriction variant on this, in
order to ensure that our results are not driven by a weak instruments problem, stemming
from the highly persistent nature of these series.26
3.4 Results
Our econometric results, using the pooling and within estimators (the latter accounts for
i) are presented in the rst two columns of Table 3. Time dummies (to account for
t) are included in both specications.27 In column 3 we present the di¤erence-GMM
results using the explanatory variables lagged 3 to 5 periods in levels, plus our excluded
IVs (in levels), as instruments. Column 4 corresponds to the system-GMM results where
we add the equation in levels, with the rst-di¤erenced variables, lagged 2 to 4 periods
as instruments (plus the external instruments in rst-di¤erences). Column 5 uses the
same instruments as in the system-GMM estimates, while imposing the common factor
restrictions.
Note that the pooling results presented in column 1 are inconsistent because they fail
to account for country-specic heterogeneity, while the within results presented in column
2 fail to account for the correlation between the transformed initial level of forest cover and
the transformed disturbance term. The GMM results (columns 3 and 4) are consistent as
long as rst-order serial correlation is absent and second-order serial correlation is present :
the latter is veried by our estimates (see the m2 test statistic, which is highly signicant,
with a p value below 0.001), whereas the former is not (see the m1 test statistic, which
rejects, again with a p value below 0.001). The overidentifying restrictions are not
26 See Hall and Mairesse (2001) and Bond, Nauges, and Windmeijer (2002), for recent surveys of the
literature on testing for unit roots in panel data.
27 For the sake of brevity we do not present the coe¢ cients associated with the time dummies in Table
3.
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rejected for the di¤erence-GMM results, whereas they are (taking a 10 percent critical
level) once the e¢ ciency of estimation is increased through the addition of the equation
in levels.
Taken together, these results suggest that the null-hypothesis of no serial correlation
in the disturbance term of the equation in levels is untenable, which leads us to prefer
the common factor restriction specication presented in column 5. Here, the test of the
overidentifying restrictions does not reject, and each individual common factor restriction
(as given in equation (9)  all of the individual p values are above 0.900) is not rejected,
though the joint test does reject. As a whole, our empirical results are relatively stable
as one moves from one estimator to another (at least as far as the sign and statistical
signicance of each individual explanatory variable is concerned), with the exception of
the relative price of timber.
The main impression that emerges from the results presented in Table 3 is that the
predictions of our theoretical model are not rejected by the data.
First, better institutions reduce deforestation, as predicted byProposition 2. Though
the coe¢ cient associated with the Bohn and Deacon index is not statistically signicant
in the di¤erence-GMM and system-GMM results, it is signicant in the within results and
in our prefered specication, given by the common factor representation.
Second, the coe¢ cient associated with the real exchange rate is positive and usually
statistically signicant (the exception being the di¤erence-GMM results), while that as-
sociated with the real exchange rate times the log of GDP per capita is negative and
statistically signicant. This conrms the theoretical predictions of Propositions 3, 4
and 5: a real depreciation increases deforestation in poor countries, with the e¤ect be-
coming negative once a threshold level of GDP per capita is reached.28 Evaluated at the
mean level of institutions in the sample, this threshold level of GDP per capita varies
between a maximum of $US 1,921 using the common factor representation of column 5,
28 Note that, because of the multiplicative terms, the total marginal impact of the real exchange rate on
deforestation is given by: dzitdeit = 5+yit6+Iit7, which implies that the threshold level of GDP per capita
below which the impact of a depreciation on deforestation is negative is given by ey =    5 + Iit7 =6,
where Iit is the mean level of the indicator of institutional quality.
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to $US 909 using the within results of column 2. Clearly the threshold is operative, what-
ever its precise level may be, and there is indeed a crisp separation between the behavior
of deforestation with respect to depreciations in the real exchange rate in poor and rich
countries.
Third, the coe¢ cient associated with institutions times the real exchange is posi-
tive and often statistically signicant. The theoretical ambiguity of Proposition 7 is
therefore resolved empirically: better institutions exacerbate the deleterious e¤ects on de-
forestation of depreciations in developing countries. Using the common factor restriction
results from column 5, the marginal impact of institutions on the rate of deforestation,
evaluated at the mean value of the real exchange rate, is positive, though not statistically
distinguishable from zero at the usual levels of condence.29 This brings into sharp focus
the importance of clearly separating the e¤ect of institutions into their direct e¤ect versus
the e¤ect that operates through the real exchange rate.30
Fourth, the impact of the relative price of timber is unstable although, in our prefered
common factor restriction specication, it would appear to be the e¤ect of temporary
changes in the price of timber that dominate (Proposition 6(ii)).
Fifth, increases in GDP per capita increase the rate of deforestation, ceteris paribus,
while the total marginal impact of log GDP per capita on the rate of deforestation, based
on the parameter estimates of column 5 and evaluated at the mean level of the real
exchange rate, is not statistically signicant at the usual levels of condence.31 While this
does not conrm Proposition 1 (deforestation is decreasing in the average rate of time
preference in the population), the empirical result is not surprizing per se in that GDP
29 The total marginal e¤ect of institutions on the rate of deforestation is given by dzitdIit = 3+eit7; where
eit is the average value of the real e¤ective exchange rate in the sample. When we include institutions,
times the real exchange rate, times log GDP per capita, the coe¢ cient associated with this variable is
statistically indistinguishable from zero, and the remainder of the results are qualitatively unchanged.
30 Institutions do have a statistically signicant and positive marginal impact on deforestation (again,
evaluated at the mean value of the real exchange rate) when one bases inference on the within results.
Their marginal impact is negative and statistically signicant when one uses the pooling results. For
di¤erence-GMM and system-GMM, their marginal impact is not signicantly di¤erent from zero, as with
the common factor restriction results.
31 The total marginal e¤ect of log GDP per capita on the rate of deforestation is given by dzitdyit =
1 + eit6. For the common factor restriction specication, for example, this marginal e¤ect is equal to
 0:011, with an associated t-statistic of  0:03.
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per capita proxies for other e¤ects, above and beyond those associated with the rate of
time preference.
Sixth, the two demographic variables (the population growth rate and rural popu-
lation density) are statistically insignicant in all of our specications, suggesting that
our intuition that the impact of these variables operates through relative prices is indeed
conrmed in the data.
Seventh, as shown by the results presented in Table 4, there does not appear to be
an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), which would correspond to a positive coe¢ cient
associated with GDP per capita and a negative coe¢ cient associated with GDP per capita
squared. Indeed, the di¤erence between the pooling results in column 1 and the results
reported in the four other columns of Table 4 indicate that the EKC may sometimes
simply be the result of country-specic, time-invariant heterogeneity. This highlights
the fragility of results, often reported in the literature, that purport to have identied an
EKC. While this issue is not the focus of this paper, it also shows how failure to account
for the capital role played by relative prices can sometimes lead to misleading statistical
inference. For example, if one re-estimates using the within estimator, while dropping
all three variables associated with the real exchange rate, one obtains an EKC (though
it has the opposite shape of what one would expect  a U instead of an inverted-U), and
better institutions increase the rate of deforestation.
4 Concluding remarks
The main nding of this paper involves the impact of the real e¤ective exchange rate
on deforestation: our econometric results do not reject the null hypothesis that real
depreciations increase deforestation in poor countries and decrease deforestation in rich
countries. Given that real depreciations are often favored as a policy instrument in the
developing world (in contrast to the developed world), this will tend to exacerbate the
process of deforestation.
In the long run, our results suggest that it is likely that the major determinant of
30
deforestation at the global level will be constituted by the relative rates of growth of
the developing and developed worlds, and the impact that this process will have on real
exchange rates. If convergence obtains, real e¤ective exchange rates will appreciate in
poor countries and depreciate in rich countries, leading to a reduction in deforestation.
On the other hand, an increase in inequality at the international level (divergence) will
lead to a depreciation of the real e¤ective exchange rates of the developing world, leading
to an increase in deforestation.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proportion of land devoted to agriculture is given by T
A
T = 1  T
F
T =
R r
r f(r;r)dr = 1  F (r;r);
where r =
R r
0
rf(r;r)dr is the average discount rate in the population and F (r;r) is the cumulative
density function associated with f(r;r). The denition of First-Order Stochastic Dominance is that
Fr (r
;r) < 0 (see La¤ont (1990)). It follows that
dTA
dr
=  Fr (r;r) > 0:
[QED]
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Straigthforward di¤erentiation of the expression for r (equation (1) in the text) yields
dr
dI =
[(C F )+(F A)]
(C F )2 
F
I > 0: It follows that T
F
I =
d
dIF (r
; :) = f(r; :)dr

dI > 0:
[QED]
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Hotellings Lemma allows one to rewrite the derivative of r (dened by equation (2)) with respect to e
as:
dr
de
=
 
pR

 1
pB
 
pBqF   pAqA  C   F 
   qC   qF   F   A

(C   F )2
which implies that
sign

dr
de

= sign

pBqF   pAqA
pBqC   pBqF

  
F   A
C   F

In terms of the corresponding cost functions, this is equivalent to
sign

dr
de

= sign

F   A + CF   CA
C   F + CC   CF  
F   A
C   F

By Assumption 3 (CC = CF ), this simplies to
sign

dr
de

= sign

F   A + CF   CA
C   F  
F   A
C   F

= sign

CF   CA
C   F

33
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, and Assumption 4 (CF < CA), it will therefore be the case that dr

de < 0,
whereas the opposite will obtain under Assumption 5. Since
TFe =
d
de
F (r; :) = f(r; :)
dr
de
< 0;
it follows that a depreciation (an increase in e) will increase deforestation in developing countries, whereas
the opposite will occur in developed countries.
[QED]
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
By a rst-order Taylor expansion of C
 
e
 
pR

; w

, we obtain (posing e = e+e)
C

e
 
pR

; w

= C

e
 
pR

; w

+
@C
 
e
 
pR

; w

@pB
e
 
pR

By Hotellings Lemma, this can be rewritten as:
C

e
 
pR

; w

= C
 
pB ; w

+ qC
 
pB ; w
 e
e
pB
Similarly
F

e
 
pR

; w

= F
 
pB ; w

+ qF
 
pB ; w
 e
e
pB
It follows that the denominator of the expression for er (equation (3) in the text) can be written as:
C

e
 
pR

; w

  F

e
 
pR

; w

= C
 
pB ; w
  F  pB ; w+ e
e

pBqC
 
pB ; w
  pBqF  pB ; w
which can be rewritten as
C

e
 
pR

; w

  F

e
 
pR

; w

= C
 
pB ; w
  F  pB ; w+ e
e

C   F + CC   CF 
One can therefore write:
er = F  pB ; w  A  pA; w
C (pB ; w)  F (pB ; w) + ee [C   F + CC   CF ]
which, by Assumption 3 (CF = CC), becomes:
er = F  pB ; w  A  pA; w
C (pB ; w)  F (pB ; w) + ee [C   F ]
By Assumption 1 (C   F > 0), it then follows that
er = F  pB ; w  A  pA; w
C (pB ; w)  F (pB ; w) + ee [C   F ]
<
F
 
pB ; w
  A  pA; w
C (pB ; w)  F (pB ; w) = r
:
[QED]
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
This is equivalent to redening prices as pA = pA =; pB = e; from which it follows that
r =
F (e; w; :)  A  pA; w; :
C (e; w; :)  F (e; w; :)
It is then immediate that an increase in e in this case will yield a decrease in deforestation:
[QED]
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Di¤erentiation of the expression for r (equation (2) in the text) yields:
dr
dpR
=
24 e  pR 1 FpB   e (  1)  pR 2 ApA  C   F 
 

e
 
pR
 1
CpB   e
 
pR
 1
FpB
  
F   A
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(C   F )2
By Hotellings Lemma, we know that ddp(p; w) = q(p; w) (i.e., the derivative of the prot function
with respect to the output price is equal to the supply function). Therefore, FpB = q
F ; ApA = q
A; and
CpB = q
C : It follows that one can rewrite the preceding expression as:
dr
dpR
=
" 
qF   (  1)  pR 1 qA  C   F 
   qC   qF   F   A
#
(C   F )2 e
 
pR
 1
from which it follows that
sign

dr
dpR

= sign
  
qF (pB)  qA(pA) (  1)  pR 1
 (qC(pB)  qF (pB))
!
 

F   A
C   F
!
This can be written (using the cost functions) as
sign

dr
dpR

= sign

F   A + CF   CA
C   F +
A + CA
 (C   F )  

F   A
C   F

which boils down to
sign

dr
dpR

= sign

CF + (1  )CA + A
 (C   F )

It will therefore always be the case (since C > F by Assumption 1) that dr

dpR
> 0 : Since TF = F (r; :)
it follows that
TFpR =
d
dpR
F (r; :) = f(r; :)
dr
dpR
> 0:
This proves part (i) of Proposition 6. Proposition 6 (ii) is proved in the same manner as Proposi-
tion 4.
[QED]
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2, the second cross-partial derivative given in
the text (equation (4)) can be rewritten as
d2r
dIde
=
 
pR
 d
dI
" 
qC   qF   CF   CA
(C   F )2
#
Taking the derivative yields
d2r
dIde
=
 
pR

 
CFI
 
qC   qF   qFI  CF   CA  C   F 2
+2FI
 
C   F   qC   qF   CF   CA

(C   F )4
or
d2r
dIde
=
 
pR
 CFI  qC   qF   qFI  CF   CA
(C   F )2 + 2

FI
C   F

dr
de
:
Recall from our preliminaries that we see weak institutions as imposing a xed cost on sustainable
harvesting: F = pBqF (lF )   wlF   FI (I); where FI (I) < 0: This specication implies that FI =
 FI (I) > 0; CFI = FI (I) < 0 and qFI = 0. The derivative of interest is then given by
d2r
dIde
=
" 
pR
  qC   qF 
(C   F )2  

2
C   F

dr
de
#
FI (I):
From Proposition 4 (i), which holds when Assumption 4 is valid, we know that dr

de < 0 for less
developed countries, from which it follows that the term in square brackets is positive. Therefore
sign

d2r
dIde

= sign

FI (I)

, implying that d
2r
dIde < 0. For developed countries, on the other hand,
Proposition 4 (ii) tells us that dr

de > 0; the term in square brackets is therefore of ambiguous sign and
so is d
2r
dIde :
[QED]
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Mean Median Standard deviation 1st order
total within 1st di¤. autocorr.
Annual rate of deforestation 0:00082 9 10 8 0:019 0:017 0:018 0:272
(0:25)
Log forest cover 8:33 8:79 2:53 1:24 0:016 0:999
(0:00009)
Log GDP per capita 7:50 7:38 1:52 0:22 0:051 1:007
(0:0008)
Institutions (Bohn and Deacon) 12:65 13:05 4:18 0:83 0:71 0:464
(0:16)
Relative price of timber 198 166 221 154 196 0:428
(0:26)
Log real e¤ective exchange rate 4:25 4:25 0:51 0:34 0:20 0:983
(0:008)
Population growth rate 2:08 2:29 1:10 0:51 0:33 0:881
(0:56)
Rural population density 294 190 327 229 20 1:017
(0:01)
Table 2: Descriptive statistics; rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cients calculated using the
system-GMM estimator, with t-3 to t-5 lags of the variables in levels as instruments
in the rst-di¤erenced equation, and t-2 to t-4 lags of the rst-di¤erenced variables as
instruments in the equation in levels (2,278 observations, standard errors in parentheses
below the rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cients)
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OLS Within Di¤erence System Common
GMM GMM factor
+ excluded IVs represen-
tation
1 2 3 4 5
Log initial forest cover 0:0001
(0:79)
0:002
(2:15)
0:093
(1:80)
0:0008
(0:70)
0:006
(0:85)
Log GDP per capita 0:009
(2:78)
0:018
(2:68)
0:037
(1:33)
0:060
(2:48)
0:180
(3:23)
Institutions  0:001
( 1:52)
 0:004
( 2:36)
 0:012
( 1:48)
 0:015
( 1:58)
 0:052
( 2:52)
Relative price of timber  4 10 6
( 2:47)
3 10 6
(1:23)
7 10 7
(0:50)
 1 10 6
( 1:24)
1 10 5
(12:56)
Log real exchange rate 0:012
(2:64)
0:014
(1:89)
0:037
(1:58)
0:057
(2:51)
0:177
(2:87)
Log real exchange rate
log GDP per capita
 0:002
( 2:66)
 0:004
( 3:19)
 0:011
( 1:85)
 0:013
( 2:34)
 0:045
( 3:26)
Log real exchange rate
Institutions
0:0003
(1:23)
0:001
(3:08)
0:003
(1:67)
0:003
(1:44)
0:012
(2:53)
Population growth rate 0:0008
(1:74)
 0:0002
( 0:24)
 0:002
( 0:92)
 0:001
( 0:91)
 0:004
( 0:85)
Rural population density 1 10 6
(1:37)
 4 10 6
( 0:47)
2 106
(0:05)
9 10 6
(1:61)
1 10 5
(0:37)
Lagged deforestation rate () 0:856
(13:57)
R
2
0:016 0:145
Number of observations 2; 278 2; 278 1; 460 1; 404 1; 404
m1 : p  value 0:000 0:000
m2 : p  value 0:000 0:000
Test of OID. restr: .p  value 0:534 0:068 0:901
Table 3: The determinants of the annual rate of deforestation, 1961-1988; in column 3,
instrumentation carried out using variables in levels lagged from t-3 to t-5; in columns 4
and 5, equation in levels is instrumented using variables in rst-di¤erences, lagged t-2 to t-
4 periods; exogenous instruments used in columns 3, 4 and 5 are: average GDP per capita
and consumer price index of the 10 most important (non-oil) trading partners, imports
plus exports as a fraction of GDP (GMM procedures all use the one-step covariance
matrix, t-statistics in parentheses)
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OLS Within Di¤erence System Common
GMM GMM factor
+ excluded IVs represen-
tation
1 2 3 4 5
Log initial forest cover 0:0001
(0:86)
0:002
(2:11)
0:061
(1:09)
0:0006
(0:54)
0:007
(0:61)
Log GDP per capita 0:013
(3:51)
 0:0009
( 0:07)
 0:055
( 0:64)
0:074
(3:01)
0:150
(2:01)
Log GDP per capita, squared  0:0006
( 2:47)
0:001
(1:84)
0:005
(1:15)
 0:0004
( 0:62)
0:001
(0:35)
Institutions  0:001
( 0:96)
 0:004
( 2:47)
 0:012
( 1:50)
 0:021
( 2:36)
 0:047
( 2:56)
Relative price of timber  4 10 6
( 2:42)
2 10 6
(1:14)
3 10 7
(0:31)
 1 10 6
( 1:50)
1 10 5
(15:84)
Log real exchange rate 0:004
(0:80)
0:018
(2:32)
0:045
(2:10)
0:052
(2:09)
0:159
(2:75)
Log real exchange rate
log GDP per capita
 0:0009
( 0:92)
 0:005
( 3:51)
 0:011
( 2:14)
 0:015
( 2:56)
 0:041
( 3:27)
Log real exchange rate
Institutions
0:0001
(0:62)
0:001
(3:20)
0:003
(1:63)
0:004
(2:16)
0:011
(2:56)
Population growth rate 0:0006
(1:32)
 0:0001
( 0:15)
 0:003
( 1:13)
 0:002
( 1:19)
 0:003
( 0:89)
Rural population density 1 10 6
(1:10)
3 10 9
(0:0003)
2 10 5
(0:43)
1 10 5
(1:68)
1 10 5
(0:38)
Lagged deforestation rate () 0:899
(16:15)
R
2
0:018 0:146
Number of observations 2; 278 2; 278 1; 460 1; 404 1; 404
m1 : p  value 0:000 0:000
m2 : p  value 0:000 0:000
Test of OID. restr: .p  value 0:678 0:124 0:925
Table 4: The determinants of the annual rate of deforestation, 1961-1988; testing for the
Environmental Kuznets Curve; in column 3, instrumentation carried out using variables
in levels lagged from t-3 to t-5; in columns 4 and 5, equation in levels is instrumented
using variables in rst-di¤erences, lagged t-2 to t-4 periods; exogenous instruments used
in columns 3, 4 and 5 are: average GDP per capita and consumer price index of the 10
most important (non-oil) trading partners, imports plus exports as a fraction of GDP
(GMM procedures all use the one-step covariance matrix, t-statistics in parentheses)
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